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Securities Regulation—Proof of Causation Under Section 14 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934—Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.'-
Petitioners were shareholders of the Electric Auto-Lite Company who
brought this action, both derivatively on behalf of Auto-Lite and as
representatives of the class of all its minority shareholders, against
Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler Linotype Company to prevent a proposed
merger between the two. Petitioners sought an injunction to prevent
the voting of allegedly misleading proxies solicited by the management
of Auto-Lite in order to secure the approval of the proposed merger
with Mergenthaler. The injunction was not granted and the necessary
two-thirds vote needed for approval of the merger was secured from
the solicited proxy votes.
Several months later petitioners amended their complaint and
asked that the merger be rescinded and other appropriate relief be
granted. The amended complaint alleged that the proxy statement
sent by the Auto-Lite management violated Section 14(a) 2 of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 14a-9 3 promulgated thereunder,
because it failed to disclose material facts necessary to prevent the
statements made from being misleading. Petitioners alleged that the
Auto-Lite board of directors recommended approval of the merger
proposal, but neglected to indicate that all of the directors were nom-
inees of Mergenthaler, which owned 50 percent of the outstanding
common stock of Auto-Lite.' There was no allegation that the specific
terms of the merger agreement were inadequately disclosed or unfair.
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, ruling
on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, held that the nondisclo-
sure constituted a material omission in light of all the circumstances
surrounding the merger.' Since the proxy votes of the minority share-
holders were necessary to procure the needed two-thirds shareholder
authorization, the district court concluded that a causal relationship
had been shown by the plaintiffs .°
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the con-
clusion that the nondisclosure was a material omission,' but reversed
on the issue of causation. The court noted that the defendant-corpora-
1 396 U.S. 375 (1970). Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court.
2 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities
exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to
solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other
than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 12 of this title.
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1969).
4 Ultimately, control during this period rested in American Manufacturing Co. since
it held voting control of Mergenthaler.
6 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., No. 63-C-1138 (ND. Ill. Feb. 14, 1966).
o Mills v Electric Auto-Lite Co., 281 F. Supp. 826 (ND. Ill. 1967).
7
 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 403 Fad 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1968).
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tions had presented evidence indicating the fairness of the merger
terms, and held that this evidence, if proven, would constitute a de-
f ense.8 Accordingly, the court stated that the case should be remanded
and the defendants given the opportunity to prove that the minority
shareholders would have voted for the merger proposal even if the
material omission had been revealed? Recognizing that "Weliance by
thousands of individuals, as here, can scarcely be inquired into,'"°
the court held that the defendants would satisfy their burden by simply
establishing the fairness of the merger terms."
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether petitioners were
entitled to summary judgment if a material omission was made in the
proxies and they were necessary to secure approval of the merger. On
this issue the Supreme Court HELD: Upon a finding that the proxy
statement contains a material misstatement or omission, a petitioner
has established the substantive elements of a claim under Section 14
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 if the proxies solicited are
essential for the accomplishment of the transaction." Though the
issue of relief was left to the determination of the district court, the
Court elaborated the relevant factors which should be considered in
granting relief. In particular, the Court held that petitioners would be
entitled to interim attorneys' fees from the defendants." In addition,
the Court indicated that the fairness of the merger should be con-
sidered in determining whether the merger should be dissolved and
whether damages should be awarded."
This casenote will examine the Supreme Court's holding in two
respects. The issue of causation will be examined, and the proper
relationship of the fairness of the merger to the claim for relief will
be analysed.
The common law action of misrepresentation required the plain-
tiff to prove both defendant's fraudulent intent and plaintiff's justifi-
8 Id. at 436.
9 Id.
19 Id. at n.10.
11 See id. at 436.
12 396 11.S. at 385. The Court indicated that it was not faced with the question
whether 14 would be violated if materially deficient proxies were solicited yet were not
needed to approve the transaction. Id. at n.7. Since the Court's holding does not eliminate
causation as a material element of a / 14 claim, but only the requirement of proof thereof,
it is arguable that in cases where the votes of the solicited shareholders could not affect
the outcome, there should be no violation of / 14. Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp.
766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), takes this position. The Supreme Court suggested, however, that
causation might be shown even if the necessary votes for approval of the corporate trans-
action are controlled by management. To support this statement, the Court cited a
comment where the author argues that causation could be found in Barnett because the
proxy misrepresentations were used to deceive the shareholders so as to prevent them from
contesting breaches of fiduciary duty under state law. Comment, Shareholders' Derivative
Suits To Enforce A Corporate Right of Action Against Directors Under SEC Rule 10b-5,
114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 578, 582-3 (1966).
13 396 U.S. at 389.
14 Id. at 386-389.
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able reliance upon the misrepresentation." The federal courts, how-
ever, have construed the misrepresentation provisions of the federal
securities laws as requiring less than the traditional elements of com-
mon law fraud." In the Mills case, the Court was faced with the
question whether section 14(a) required the plaintiff to prove a causal
relationship between the proxy omission and the shareholders approval
of the merger. The evidentiary problems involved in proving reliance
by shareholders have arisen in a number of securities cases.
In contrast to Mills, earlier cases have required the plaintiff to
prove a causal nexus between the proxy omission and the corporate
action. For example, in Hoover v. Allen," the plaintiff alleged that a
false proxy statement had caused some shareholders to sell their
shares to the defendants, thus giving defendants control. The com-
plaint asserted that the defendants then mismanaged the corporate
assets. The court noted that the purpose of section 14 was to insure
the fair disclosure of information to solicited shareholders, and that
to establish a claim for relief under section 14, the plaintiff must
establish a causal relationship between the proxy violation and the
shareholders' approval of a corporate transaction. The court stated:
In the absence of some allegation of infringement upon
corporate suffrage rights or some corporate action taken as
a result of such infringement, no cause of action under sec-
tion 14(a) has been made out."
As the plaintiff could not establish this causal relationship, his claim
for relief on this ground was dismissed.
Barnett v. Anaconda Co." affirms the proposition that a causal
nexus between the proxy violation and shareholder approval of the
corporate transaction must be shown by the plaintiff. In Barnett the
plaintiff alleged a violation of section 14 in a derivative action brought
on behalf of Wire & Cable Co., the acquired corporation. Before the
merger, defendant Anaconda owned 73 percent of the outstanding stock
of the acquired company. In granting defendant's motion to dismiss,
the court held that since only a two-thirds vote was needed to approve
the merger and defendant owned more than two-thirds of the outstand-
ing stock, the "but-for element—the element of causation—does not
and, indeed, could not exist?'" Although the Mills case is distinguish-
able because there the proxy votes were necessary for approval of the
merger, Barnett clearly indicates that a but-for test of causation should
16 W. Prosser, Law of Torts 700 (3d. ed. 1964).
16 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855-56 (2d Cir. 1968); 2 L. Loss,
Securities Regulations 917 (2d ed. 1961); Ruder, Civil Liability Under 10-5: Judicial
Revision of Legislative Intent, 57 Nw. U.L. Rev. 627, 677-80 (1963).
17 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
18 Id. at 230; cf. Lapchak v. Sisto, (1952-1956 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. ff 90,721 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1955).
10 238 F. Supp. 766 (SD.N.Y. 1965).
20 Id. at 771.
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be applied. Thus, a plaintiff would be required to show that the merger
would not have been approved but for the omission or misstatement.
The but-for test which Barnett espouses may result from an in-
terpretation of the Supreme Court's opinion in I.I. Case Co. v.
Borak.2' The case was cited by the court in Barnett to support its
conclusion on the issue of causation. The court in Barnett distin-
guished Borak on the basis that the complaint in Borak asserted that
the merger would not have been approved but for the false and mis-
leading proxy statements. Since the Supreme Court stated in Barak
that "the causal relationship of the proxy material and the merger
are questions of fact to be resolved at trial," 22
 the court in Barnett
reasoned that the plaintiff had the burden of proving the but-for ele-
ment of causation.' The Supreme Court's holding in Mills indicates
that such an interpretation of Borak was not correct."
The difficulties of proving actual causation have also been con-
sidered by the courts in actions brought under Section 10 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934" and Rule 10b-5. 26 For example,
in the case of List v. Fashion Park, Inc.?' the plaintiff-seller sought
damages under Rule 1013-5 from the defendant-buyers claiming that
certain material facts had not been disclosed to him. The court rec-
ognized the evidentiary problem involved when a plaintiff is forced
to prove his reliance upon a fact unknown to him. Accordingly, it
held that in such cases "the proper test [of reliance] is whether the
plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently than he did if
the defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact . . . . 7)28
Since the court defined a material misstatement or material omission
as information which would affect the judgment of a reasonable inves-
tor, the application of this test would generally lead to the conclusion
that the plaintiff would have acted differently if the facts had been
disclosed.
In the recent case of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.," a similar
test was employed to establish Rule 10b-5 liability for failure to dis-
close the contents of one sample drill hole which ultimately led to a
major ore discovery. The court emphasized that a reasonable investor
21 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
22 Id. at 431.
22 See 238 F. Supp. at 770-71.
24 396 U.S. at 383-4.
26 13 	 § 785(b) (1964).
26 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969).
27 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).
28 Id. at 463. However, the court required the plaintiff to show his reliance upon
any material misrepresentation. It noted:
Assuredly, to abandon the requirement of reliance would be to facilitate outsiders'
proof of insiders' fraud. . . . But this strikes us as an inadequate reason for
reading out of the rule so basic an element of tort law as the principle of causa-
tion in fact.
Id.
29 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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would likely attach importance to this information pertaining to the
sample drill hole in deciding whether to purchase or sell his securities
in Texas Gulf Sulphur Co." Accordingly it held that such information
was material.
The existence of a material omission in List did not automatically
establish causation, for the defendants were allowed to introduce evi-
dence indicating that the plaintiff would have bought or sold his
stock even if the truth had been revealed to him. Thus, for example,
the court of appeals in List held that the evidence supported the find-
ing of the district court that the plaintiff would have sold his securities
even if the material information had been disclosed to him.
In Mills, the Supreme Court and the court of appeals were in
agreement that the party alleging a proxy violation should not have
the burden of proving the extent to which any material omission
would have affected the judgment of those shareholders whose votes
were solicited. The courts' disagreement, however, centered on the
relevance of the fairness of the merger to the issue of causation.
The court of appeals held that the fairness of the merger was
relevant to the issue of causation." On remand, the respondent-cor-
porations were to be given the opportunity and the burden of proving
that the merger proposal was fair and reasonable. Proof of the fairness
of the merger would negate the presumption of a causal relationship
between the proxy omission and approval of the merger proposal. By
requiring the defendant to rebut the presumption of causation, the
court of appeals adopted an approach similar to that offered by the
court of appeals in List. The court of appeals raised the fairness of
the merger itself to the level of an affirmative defense to the presump-
tion of causality, reasoning that the fairness of the merger was a
practical and equitable means of resolving the issue of causation. The
plaintiffs would not be required to establish reliance, but rather the
burden of negating the presumption of reliance would be on the party
responsible for the proxy violation. Nonetheless, by permitting the
fairness of the merger terms to serve as a defense to a claim under
section 14, the court of appeals assumed that shareholders would
accept a fair merger proposal even if the material omission had been
revealed to them.
The Supreme Court's holding in Mills that causation is conclu-
sively presumed as a result of the solicitation of proxies containing
material omissions which are necessary to secure approval of the cor-
porate proposal, rejects as irrelevant, evidence of the fairness of the
merger terms. Neither the statute nor Rule 14a-9 contain the require-
ment that causation be proven by the plaintiff, and the Supreme Court
reasoned from the stautory language and from the purposes of section
14 as enunciated in LI. Case Co. v. Borak,32 that the policy of Con-
3° Id. at 848-53.
31- See p. 1025 supra.
82 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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gress would be best served by eliminating the necessity of specifically
establishing causation." In Borak a shareholder of J.I. Case Co.
brought an action seeking damages and recision of the consummated
merger- between J.I. Case and American Tractor Corporation on the
grounds that proxies had been solicited in violation of the statute.
The Court reasoned that the purpose of section 14 was to provide
adequate disclosure of information to shareholders, and that a private
right of action should be implied as being necessary to SEC enforce-
ment of proxy violations." The Court expanded this theory in Mills,
reasoning that if liability were foreclosed because of a finding that
the terms of the merger were fair, then outrageous misrepresentations
not relating to the merger proposal would be condoned" and private
actions discouraged." Moreover, the Court rejected the assumption
of the court of appeals that the shareholders would accept any fair
merger." Thus, the plaintiff must now show only that the misstate-
ment or omission was material, that is, whether the information would
be likely to influence the judgment of a reasonable investor in deter-
mining whether to buy or to sell securities. Under this test, the
determination of reliance is inherent in the determination of material-
ity.
Clearly, the elimination of the requirement that causation be
proven by the plaintiff, and the exclusion of evidence which might
negate the presumption of causality encourage full disclosure of ma-
terial information to the shareholders and facilitate private redress
of proxy violations.
It is only when the holding of the Supreme Court is viewed in
the context of the peculiar facts of Mills that difficulties are raised.
In Mills a claim for relief was readily established yet no remedy
could be afforded to the complaining party. Recision of the merger,
the Court suggested," is unlikely since there was no allegation that
the merger was unfair. It is improbable that money damages would
be granted on remand, since the merger was apparently fair and mon-
etarily beneficial to the shareholders." Indeed, the recognition by the
Supreme Court that the shareholders might not receive any money
damages did not alter the Court's willingness to allow the plaintiffs
to recover interim attorneys' fees." In granting such an award, the
33 396 U.S. at 381-83.
34 For a discussion of the bases for implying a private remedy under § 14, see Note,
59 Nw. U.L. Rev. 809 (1965).
85 396 U.S. at 382.
36 Id.
8T Id. at n.5.
38 The Court noted:
Possible forms of relief will include setting aside the merger ... but, as the Court
of Appeals below noted, nothing in the statutory policy "requires the court to
unscramble a corporate transaction merely because a violation occurred."
396 U.S. at 386.
89 Id.
40 Id. at 392.
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Supreme Court departed, without specific statutory authority, from
the traditional common law rule against granting attorneys' fees.
Justice Black objected to the Court's implying a right of recovery
of attorneys' fees," but without the granting of such fees the policy of
private enforcement would not be encouraged.
The most important issue in Mills is whether private actions
should be fostered in cases where the shareholders have not been
monetarily damaged as a result of a corporate merger or transaction
for which deficient proxies have been solicited. It may be argued that
the approach of the court of appeals gives due consideration to the
interests of all the parties, particularly as it allows proof of the fair-
ness of the merger terms by the defendant to defeat a claim for relief.
However, the SEC might still have the authority to redress violations
of the proxy rules in cases where a private action is foreclosed.'
It is submitted, however, that the Supreme Court's holding will
more aptly insure adequate disclosure of information to the share-
holders whose votes are solicited and encourage private suits to redress
proxy violations. If fairness were a defense to maintaining a claim
under section 14, not only would possibly gross misrepresentations
be tacitly condoned, but shareholders would be deterred from suing
to test the validity of a merger or other transaction in cases where
it is doubtful whether the merger terms were unfair. Thus, the ap-
proach adopted by the Supreme Court is preferable to the rationale
of the court of appeals.
The purposes of section 14 cannot be fostered when a wrongdoer
can concede his wrongdoing, yet plead immunity from liability on
the ground that profit was made for the benefit of all. Indeed, the
logical extension of permitting fairness to serve as a defense is that
no material information need be disclosed to the shareholders if the
merger increases the fair market value of their stock. The Supreme
Court's holding in Mills supports the policy of the 1934 Act of assur-
ing full and fair disclosure by indicating that a private right of action
exists regardless of proof of injury. This interpretation of section 14
should have a profound effect on full and fair disclosure not only
under that section, but also under the disclosure sections of the 1934
Act.
WILLARD H. KRASNOW
41 Justice Black reasoned that
ft]he courts are interpreters, not creators, of legal rights to recover and if
there is a need for recovery of attorneys' fees to effectuate the policies of the
Act here involved, the need should in my judgment be met by Congress, not by
this court.
Id. at 397.
42 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934,.§ 32, 15 U.S.C.] 78ff (1964), provides for
civil penalties of $10,000 and/or imprisonment for "wilfully and knowingly" making a
false or misleading statement in any application, report or document required to be filed
under this title.
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